Volume 9, Number 2
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
David Ricardo: Theory of Free International
Trade
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| Few
ideas have been as widely accepted by economists
and as roundly rejected by many other people
as the doctrine of free international trade.
Economists base their acceptance of the
mutual benefits from such trade on a concept
called comparative advantage. The theory
is most closely associated with the writings
of the great English classical school economist
David Ricardo. Although his career in the
field of political economy was brief, Ricardo
became one of the most influential—and
financially successful—practitioners
the discipline has ever known.
Today, world trade
agreements are under increasing attack.
Many people are deeply concerned about such
issues as outsourcing and the physical location—and
relocation—of firms doing business
across national borders. In light of these
developments, we offer this latest Economic
Insights on the life and ideas of one
of free trade’s most ardent theoretical
defenders. Anyone interested in this issue
should become familiar with Ricardo’s
work. We hope this short piece provides
a useful starting point.
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Bob McTeer
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas |
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David Ricardo Theory
of Free International Trade
David Ricardo was born in London
in 1772, one of 17 children. His parents were Sephardic
Jews who had emigrated to England. His father, Abraham,
was a successful stockbroker. Ricardo’s business
career started when he began working for his father
at age 14, but at 21 he married a Quaker, which created
a family rift that sent Ricardo into the world completely
on his own. He nonetheless prospered as a stockbroker
and left a vast estate at his death.
Having no money problems, Ricardo
could afford to spend a great deal of time in intellectual
pursuits, and he became interested in many subjects.
Besides political economy, which he took up after reading
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1799,
he also studied mathematics, mineralogy, chemistry and
geology. His career as an active political economist
lasted but 14 years.[1]
Ricardo’s first major work
in the field of economics, The High Price of Bullion,
a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes, was
published in 1810. This pamphlet became very influential,
making Ricardo’s name familiar to those in government
who sought economic advice. A parliamentary inquiry
into the high bullion price may have been the direct
result of the pamphlet’s publication, but that’s
speculative. In any case, the government report’s
conclusion—that the inflation then occurring in
England was the result of too many paper banknotes being
created—was Ricardo’s own claim in his pamphlet.
This helped to cement in the public’s
mind the idea that Ricardo was an economist of some
standing. That status brought him into contact with
other famous political economists of his time, notably
James Mill and Thomas Robert Malthus. Mill became Ricardo’s
mentor, coaching him and inspiring him to write more
in their shared field.
In 1814, Ricardo retired from
business life and bought an estate in Gloucestershire.
A year later, he published his next major work in economics,
Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the
Profits of Stock. In that work, Ricardo laid out
what was to become a key idea in neoclassical economics:
the so-called law of diminishing returns as it applied
to labor and capital. Generally, as it applies to cultivation
of crops, this law states that increasing the quantities
of inputs will increase total production up to a point,
but then output must decline, given that the land used
is fixed in size. Although increasing production is
possible, and perhaps common at first, at some point
the marginal returns to additional inputs must decline,
followed by their average returns and, thus, total output
must decline as well.
Ricardo’s purpose in exploring
the issue of land rents was British legislation called
the Corn Laws. Passed in 1815, these laws forbade the
importation into England of food grown elsewhere and
sought to maintain the rising prices for British agricultural
products that had occurred during the Napoleonic wars,
when the French navy had embargoed British ports. Facing
the loss of food imports, Britain had to use more of
its own land to feed its population. This caused crop
prices, and hence, land rents to rise at rapid rates
during the war period. The protectionist Corn Laws were
an attempt to maintain the agricultural status quo after
Napoleon’s defeat and a return to peaceful conditions.
Ricardo, himself a landowner who
was profiting from the rising rents, nevertheless argued
that the Corn Laws should not be enacted and, after
they were, continued to argue strenuously for their
repeal. Beyond that, the observed rent increases suggested
to Ricardo a general theory of land rent. The reason
rent exists, he argued, was that as more and more land
of diminishing fertility was applied to growing food,
the better lands commanded a premium. This was an argument
for rent on the extensive margin, that is,
as more land was cultivated. But Ricardo also argued
for rent on the intensive margin, that is,
where similar lands experienced different diminishing
returns to capital and labor. In Ricardo’s view,
the Corn Laws generated rents both extensively and intensively.
His analysis of the effects of the Corn Laws produced
the famous Ricardian theory of rent.[2]
In 1817, he expanded his pamphlet
on rent and retitled it On the Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation. By 1819, he had been elected
to the House of Commons, where he continued to be an
active participant in the policy discussions of his
time.
Ricardo died suddenly of an ear
infection in 1823, leaving an estate estimated at $126
million (current dollars). As Mark Blaug comments: “Ricardo
may or may not have been the greatest economist that
ever lived, but he was certainly the richest.”[3]
Ricardo’s Contributions
and System
Ricardo’s approach
to economics differed markedly from that of Adam Smith.
Ricardo was a pure theoretician, an architect of a simple,
highly abstract model from which he drew policy conclusions.
His most important assumption was that economic growth
must decline and end due to the scarcity of land and
its falling marginal productivity. In this, we see the
origin of John Stuart Mill’s later contention
that economic stagnation would flow from the working
out of the capitalist productive process. It also is
very suggestive of later arguments by John Maynard Keynes
of the continuing potential macrostagnation that, according
to Keynes and many of his followers, flows from a chronic
insufficiency of aggregate demand in any relatively
closed-market economy.
Ricardo’s foremost contemporary
critic was Malthus, author of the famous pamphlet An
Essay on the Principle of Population. It was from
Malthus that Ricardo took the argument of an evergrowing
population that pressed against all economic expansions,
an assumption that lay at the heart of Ricardo’s
model. His central consideration in his Principles
was to show how distributional changes between wages,
rent, interest and profit affected the prospects for
long-run capital accumulation and economic growth.[4]
Because his model produced a falling rate of profit
and an ever-rising price for corn (grains), Ricardo
favored an end to the Corn Laws, arguing that Britain
ought to import corn from countries better equipped
to produce it at lower cost. He hated the rising rents
he attributed to the laws, since they came, in his view,
at the expense of the driving force of the economy—profits.
Twenty-three years after his death,
the laws were repealed and Ricardo’s international
free trade agenda became one with British public policy.
Ricardo had provided an answer to Britain’s long-term
growth problems, and Britain became the “workshop
of the world,” importing most of its food and
“outsourcing” most of its agricultural employment.
Ricardo’s ideas became “the fountainhead
of all nineteenth-century free trade doctrine!”[5]
One of the ideas for which Ricardo
is most remembered is the theory of comparative advantage.
Ricardo demonstrated that for two nations without input
factor mobility, specialization and trade could result
in increased total output and lower costs than if each
nation tried to produce in isolation. Since Ricardo’s
exposition, the distinction between absolute and comparative
advantage has been taught as one of the field’s
most brilliant insights. Nations will export not only
what they have an absolute advantage in producing, but
also what they have a comparative cost edge in producing.
Some historians of economic thought have sought to show
that others, specifically James Mill and Robert Torrens,
stated the idea, or something close to it, prior to
Ricardo. Such writers tend to discount Ricardo’s
version of the theory as very short and possibly even
incorrect.[6]
Other economic historians defend
Ricardo and argue the contrary.[7] Regardless of ongoing
academic disputes, it is unlikely that historians of
economic thought will reverse their position on Ricardo’s
original authorship of this idea.
Another major contribution Ricardo
made to economics was the doctrine of fiscal equivalence,
or, as it has come to be known today, Ricardian equivalence.
His argument, as put forth in Chapter 17 of his Principles,
is as follows: It doesn’t matter whether government
finances itself through taxes or debt. They are equivalent
and have no appreciable effect on household consumption
or capital formation. This is because either the public
sector will save or run a deficit, or households will
do likewise and at the same rate. Further, expectantly,
taxpayers view a deficit as a future tax increase and
will save to pay for it, while a surplus is viewed as
a future tax cut with an opposite result. Households
will arrange their private affairs to frustrate the
long-run effects of either finance approach, as judged
from a macroeconomic policy perspective. (To be sure,
Ricardo did not want government to issue debt rather
than raise tax revenue, regardless of the truth of his
equivalence insight.)
Other concerns that Ricardo devoted
himself to were monetary reform, the distribution of
national income and the determination of an invariant
measure of value. Ricardo favored redemption of paper
money in gold bullion, argued for decoupling the Bank
of England from that nation’s money supply creation
and contended that labor costs were the best longrun
invariant measure of the value of goods and services—a
labor cost theory of value not unlike what Smith had
also proposed in Wealth of Nations. Ricardo
was a believer in the strict quantity theory of money,
whereby the price level is directly proportional to
the quantity of money circulating and changes in that
quantity of money change prices instead of real factors.
Ricardo’s theory of rent
was tied directly to the marginal productivity of land,
his theory of value was tied directly to labor costs,
and his theory of distribution stood atop both concepts,
with Malthusian economic stagnation as a major assumption.
Ricardo was not so naive as to attempt to explain all
market prices by labor costs. He recognized the importance
of “nonreproducible” commodities whose value
was solely determined by their rarity in the market.
However, he considered these things—rare paintings,
fine wines—to be a small portion of overall market
consumption. He also allowed a role for capital in determining
value and argued that an increase in fixed (more permanent)
capital as opposed to circulating (perishable) capital
would increase value. By allowing value to be influenced
by capital, Ricardo indirectly suggested that time
played a major role in value, a discovery later generally
attributed to other economists.[8]
Ricardo’s model, abstract
and highly deductive, became the means by which he advocated
public policy. A free trade enthusiast, he also was
not a fan of public expenditure, believing most such
spending to be at worst wasteful or at best incapable
of changing aggregate well-being and output. His influence
should not be underestimated, especially in Great Britain,
for as Keynes wrote, “Ricardo conquered England
as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain.”[9]
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Robert L. Formaini
Senior Economist |
| Notes
-
“David Ricardo,” by G.
de Vivo, in The New Palgrave: A
Dictionary of Economics, ed. John
Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman,
vol. 4, London: Macmillan Press, 1987,
pp. 183–98.
-
See the general discussion in A
History of Economic Theory and Method,
by Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., and Robert
F. Hébert, 4th ed., New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1997, pp. 144–46.
-
Great Economists before Keynes,
by Mark Blaug, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986, p. 201.
-
Ekelund and Hébert (1997),
p. 147.
-
Blaug (1986), p. 203.
-
Classical Economics: An Austrian
Perspective on the History of Economic
Thought, by Murray Rothbard, vol.
2, Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, 1995, pp.
96–98.
-
“David Ricardo’s Discovery
of Comparative Advantage,” by
Roy J. Ruffin, History of Political
Economy, vol. 34, Winter 2002,
pp. 727–48.
-
Ekelund and Hébert (1997), p.
148.
-
The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, by John Maynard
Keynes, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936,
p. 32.
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The Beneficent
Effects of Free Trade and National Profit
Equalization
Under a system of
perfectly free commerce, each country naturally
devotes its capital and labour to such employments
as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit
of individual advantage is admirably connected
with the universal good of the whole. By
stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity,
and by using most efficaciously the peculiar
powers bestowed by nature, it distributes
labour most effectively and most economically:
while, by increasing the general mass of
productions, it diffuses general benefit,
and binds together by one common tie of
interest and intercourse, the universal
society of nations throughout the civilized
world. It is this principle which determines
that wine shall be made in France and Portugal,
that corn shall be grown in America and
Poland, and that hardware and other goods
shall be manufactured in England.
In one and the same
country, profits are, generally speaking,
always on the same level; or differ only
as the employment of capital may be more
or less secure and agreeable. It is not
so between different countries. If the profits
of capital employed in Yorkshire should
exceed those of capital employed in London,
capital would speedily move from London
to Yorkshire, and an equality of profits
would be effected; but if in consequence
of the diminished rate of production in
the lands of England, from the increase
of capital and population, wages should
rise, and profits fall, it would not follow
that capital and population would necessarily
move from England to Holland, or Spain,
or Russia, where profits might be higher.
—On the
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), 133–34.
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Taxation
Impedes Growth, and Its Incidence Falls
Not Necessarily Where the Law Says
There are no taxes
which have not a tendency to lessen the
power to accumulate. All taxes must either
fall on capital or revenue. If they encroach
on capital, they must proportionably diminish
that fund by whose extent the extent of
the productive industry of the country must
always be regulated; and if they fall on
revenue, they must either lessen accumulation,
or force the contributors to save the amount
of the tax, by making a corresponding diminution
of their former unproductive consumption
of the necessaries and luxuries of life.
Some taxes will produce these effects in
a much greater degree than others; but the
great evil of taxation is to be found, not
so much in any selection of its objects,
as in the general amount of its effects
taken collectively.
Taxes are not necessarily
taxes on capital because they are laid on
capital; nor on income because they are
laid on income…. The desire which
every man has to keep his station in life,
and to maintain his wealth at the height
which it has once attained, occasions most
taxes, whether laid on capital or on income,
to be paid from income; and therefore as
taxation proceeds, or as government increases
its expenditure, the annual enjoyments of
the people must be diminished, unless they
are enabled proportionally to increase their
capitals and income. It should be the policy
of governments to encourage a disposition
to do this in the people, and never to lay
such taxes as will inevitably fall on capital;
since by so doing, they impair the funds
for the maintenance of labour, and thereby
diminish the future production of the country.
—On
the Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation, 152–53.
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The Potential
Pitfalls for Paper Monies
There is no point
more important in issuing paper money, than
to be fully impressed with the effects which
follow from the principle of limitation
of quantity. It will scarcely be believed
fifty years hence, that Bank directors and
ministers gravely contended in our times,
both in parliament, and before committees
of parliament, that the issue of notes by
the Bank of England, unchecked by any power
in the holders of such notes, to demand
in exchange either specie, or bullion, had
not, nor could have any effect on the prices
of commodities, bullion, or foreign exchanges.
After the establishment of Banks, the State
has not the sole power of coining or issuing
money. The currency may as effectually be
increased by paper as by coin; so that if
a State were to debase its money, and limit
its quantity, it could not support its value,
because the Banks would have an equal power
of adding to the whole quantity of circulation.
On these principles, it will be seen that
it is not necessary that paper money should
be payable in specie to secure its value;
it is only necessary that its quantity should
be regulated according to the value of the
metal which is declared to be the standard.
If the standard were gold of a given weight
and fineness, paper might be increased with
every fall in the value of gold, or, which
is the same thing in its effects, with every
rise in the price of goods…. Experience,
however, shows, that neither a State nor
a Bank ever have had the unrestricted power
of issuing paper money, without abusing
that power: in all States, therefore, the
issue of paper money ought to be under some
check and control; and none seems so proper
for that purpose, as that of subjecting
the issuers of paper money to the obligation
of paying their notes, either in gold coin
or bullion.
—On the
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,
353–54, 356. |
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| About
Economic Insights
Economic Insights
is a publication of the Federal Reserve
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